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Contract Rights and Property Rights:
A Case Study in the Relationship
Between Individual Liberties and
Constitutional Structure
Michael W. McConnellt
In this Essay, Professor McConnell argues that constitutional interpretation should extend beyond the substantiveprinciples expressed in the
Constitution to the structuraland institutionalchoices of the Framers. As
an example, he explores possible explanationsfor the disparate treatment
the Constitutionaccordsto property and contract rights. Despite the Founders' general commitment to the preservation ofprivate contract andproperty rights, the contracts clause, by its terms, applies only to state
governments, while the just compensation clause applies solely to the federalgovernment.
Part I of the Essay summarizes the textual problem posed by the contracts and just compensation clauses. Part II reviews the history of the
adoption of those clauses. PartIII offers two possible explanationsfor the
reference of each of the two clauses to but one of the two levels of government in our federal system. Part IV concludes the Essay by discussing
some implications of these explanations.
INTRODUCTION

The natural inclination is to think that individual "rights" must be
© 1988 by State University of New York Press.
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Michigan State University; J.D. 1979, University of Chicago.
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of this paper, and Albert Alschuler, David Currie, Howard Dickman, Frank Easterbrook, Richard
Epstein, Geoffrey Miller, Ellen Frankel Paul, Richard Stewart, Geoffrey Stone, David Strauss, and
Cass Sunstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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protected against "the state"-that is, against government in general.
Political liberalism, in both its new and old varieties, derives from a perceived conflict between individual autonomy and governmental authority. Yet it is striking how often the language of the United States
Constitution protects important rights against one level or branch of government but not against the others. The provisions of the Bill of Rights
apply only to the federal government and not to the states; the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only to the states
and not to the federal government; the first amendment applies to Congress and not, apparently, to the executive or judicial branches. It is also
striking that the courts typically disregard these limits and protect rights
against government action generally. Thus, most provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been "incorporated" against the states;' the equal protection
2
clause has been "reverse-incorporated" against the federal government;
and the apparent limitation of the first amendment to legislative action
has been ignored.'
One of the most puzzling, and thus most interesting, instances in
which the constitutional text guarantees individual rights against one
level of government but not the others appears in the area of economic
liberties-the rights of property and contract. The fifth amendment prohibits takings of private property for public use without just compensation. But, until its incorporation through the fourteenth amendment at
the end of the 19th century, the just compensation clause applied only to
the federal government.' States were free to take property without providing compensation, unless the taking happened to violate some other
provision of law. On the other hand, the contracts clause of article I,
section 10, prohibits laws "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." This
provision applies only to the states. The federal government may impair
the obligation of contracts without constitutional restraint unless the
impairment is also a taking of property or a violation of some other provision of the Constitution.
A mere glance at the Constitution suffices to show that this difference in treatment was not inadvertent. Section 10 of article I contains
certain limitations on state powers; section 9 of the same Article contains
1. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).
2. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
3. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (first
amendment challenge to executive action); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (first
amendment challenge to court order); see also Denbeaux, The First Word of the FirstAmendment, 80
Nw. U.L. REV. 1156 (1986) (questioning the wide acceptance of the application of the first
amendment to the non-legislative branches in light of the historical purposes of the amendment).
4. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The Court applied the just
compensation clause to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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parallel limitations on the powers of Congress. Section 10 provides that

"[n]o State shall... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Section 9, which applies

only to Congress, provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed." The omission of a contracts clause from section 9
is too obvious to be anything but deliberate.5
The inconsistent treatment of these two overlapping economic rights
has been occasionally commented upon,6 never convincingly explained, 7
and often ignored by scholars in the field. I will explore possible reasons
for this disparate treatment of contract and property rights, and thus the

original constitutional connection between individual rights and the
structure of government. I propose two different, but complementary,
explanations loosely derived from comments made by Hamilton and

Madison in The Federalist Papers. The "Hamiltonian" explanation
emphasizes the special role of contracts, as opposed to tangible property,
in national commerce. The "Madisonian" explanation emphasizes the
relation between threats to contractual and property rights and the prob-

lem of faction in state and federal government.
Part I of this Essay will briefly summarize the textual problem posed
by the contracts and just compensation clauses, as illuminated by the

conceptions of property rights prevalent at the time the Constitution was
drafted. Part II will review the history of the adoption of the two clauses

with attention to the relationship between individual liberties and constitutional structure. Part III will offer a speculative and analytical account
of the reasons for the structure of these constitutional provisions.
Finally, Part IV will discuss some of the implications of these conclu-

sions for constitutional analysis today.8

5. For the historical context underlying this assertion, see infra text accompanying notes 4951 & 54-64.
6. See, e.g., B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 9, 172 n.237
(1938); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and CongressionalPowers, 1801-1835,
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 895 (1982); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L.
REV. 512, 512-13 (1944); Hutchinson, Laws Impairingthe Obligation of Contracts, 1 S.L. REV. (n.s.)
401, 409-10 (1875); Johnson, The Contract Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution, 16 Ky. L.J. 222,
223-24 (1928); McKinney, The Constitutional Protection of the Obligation of Contracts, 53 CENT.
L.J. 44, 45 (1901).
7. The most serious attempt to explain this anomaly was made by Professor William W.
Crosskey. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 352-60 (1953). For further discussion of Crosskey's view, see infra note 93.
8. I will not address the "liberty of contract," which was an aspect of substantive due process
that originated in the late 19th century. This Essay deals with rights arisingfrom contract, not the
right to make contracts. Nor will the Essay deal, except tangentially, with the procedural due
process protections for property under the fifth amendment.
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I
CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY:

A

TEXTUAL PUZZLE

Critics as well as admirers frequently observe that the American
constitutional scheme was designed, in large part, for the protection of
private property. James Madison, writing in The Federalist No. 10,
stated that "the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring
property" is "the first object of government." 9 He wrote to Thomas Jefferson that the principal motivation for the Constitutional Convention
was not (as is often thought) that the Confederation government was
ineffectual, but that the rights of property were endangered by the unstable popular governments of many of the states. 10 Gouverneur Morris,
also a leading draftsman, stated during the Constitutional Convention:
"Life and liberty [are] generally said to be of more value, than property.
An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property
[is] the main object of Society."' I These were not isolated statements or
idiosyncratic views: The protection of private property was a nearly
unanimous intention among the founding generation.12
The Constitution is, in most respects, admirably suited to the protection of private property. We think immediately of its explicit restrictions against takings of property without due process and just
compensation, against impairment of the obligation of contracts, against
bills of attainder, and against debased currency, all backed up by the
institution of judicial review. Still more important, however, is the structure of government, which is designed to promote economic stability and
to insulate property rights from popular upheavals.
Discussions at the Convention show that the Framers were well
aware of the dangers to property that are inherent in unchecked popular
assemblies. Gouverneur Morris, for example, commented that "[e]very
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
10. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 27 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) (letter composed Oct. 24,
1787). Other commentators of the period agreed. See, e.g., Letters From the FederalFarmerNo. I
(Oct. 8, 1787), reprinted in I P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 258
(1987) and in 2 H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST § 2.8.6, at 226-27 (1981)
("[S]everal legislatures, by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause
of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several orders of men in the community have
been prepared, by degrees, for a change of government .... )
11. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 533 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].

12. For greater elaboration and support for this conclusion, see E. JOHNSON, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC FREEDOM 191-92 (1973); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the
Right to Propertyin Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 469-70 (1976); Plattner, American
Democracy and the Acquisitive Spirit, in How CAPITALISTIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 14-17 (R.
Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1982); J. Nedelsky, Property and the Framers of the United States
Constitution: A Study of the Political Thought of James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, and James
Wilson 1-2, 11-12 (Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Chicago, Mar. 1977) (copy on file with author).
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man of observation had seen in the Democratic branches of the State
Legislatures, precipitation-in Congress changeableness-in every
department excesses against personal liberty, private property, and personal safety." 13 The Convention's proposal of an extended union, deliberative representation, and checks and balances was the antidote to this
problem. The structure of government was designed to promote "the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community," 14 and to reduce
the "instability, injustice, and confusion" that had always plagued popular governments. 15 By making legislative change difficult to achieve, the
system inclined toward limited government. It also provided procedural
safeguards to protect settled expectations from passing political passions.
The underlying bias of the system was to preserve the status quo; this in
turn protected the preexisting distribution of property.
The difference in application of the contracts and just compensation
clauses, however, is difficult to square with this emphasis on property
rights. If taking property without compensation is wrong, why is it permitted to the states? If impairing contract rights is unfair, why is it permitted to the federal government? A simple theory of the importance of
property will not explain the discrepancy; nor is it explicable on the
ground that one level of government is inherently more trustworthy than
the other. Unless we are to conclude that the Constitution is simply
incoherent on these points-and the presumption should be to the contrary-the search for an explanation must go beyond the Framers' attitude toward property to the connection they saw between private rights
and the structure of political institutions.
These reflections raise practical questions of interpretation. Should
the contracts clause be interpreted broadly, so as to protect against takings of property by a state? This depends, in large part, on whether there
was a reason not to apply the just compensation clause to the states in the
first instance. Should the just compensation (or possibly the due process
or ex post facto) clause be interpreted broadly, so as to prevent the federal government from impairing the obligation of contracts? Again, this
depends on one's view of the underlying purposes.
13. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 512 (punctuation clarified);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 9, at 282-83 (J. Madison) (stating the need for
constitutional protection of personal security and private rights); 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 10, at 27 (letter to Jefferson noting frequent encroachments by state laws on
individual rights); Lettersfrom The FederalFarmerNo. 1, supra note 10 (citing the infringement by

state legislatures of creditors' rights).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 78.
15. Id. at 77; see also Madison, Notes on the Confederacy (Apr. 1787), in 1 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 320, 324 (Philadelphia 1867) (decrying the multiplicity of
state laws). On Madison's understanding of the connection between government instability and
invasion of property rights, see J. Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 85-90.
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The nature of the problem, as well as its persistence, is illustrated by
two Supreme Court decisions-one under Chief Justice Marshall, the
first decision to construe the contracts clause, and the other at the end of
the Court's 1985 term, a recent attempt to construe the just compensation clause. Both play upon the slender distinction between contract and
property rights.
In Fletcher v. Peck, 16 the State of Georgia attempted to seize large
land holdings from the current owners (who were, for the most part,
bona fide purchasers) because the original grants had been procured by
bribing the legislature. This attempt would appear to be a classic "taking," as Marshall's opinion for the Court implicitly acknowledged.
Where are the "limits to the legislative power," he wondered, "if the
property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized
without compensation?" 17 But since the just compensation clause did
not apply to the states, the Court had to look elsewhere for a basis to
invalidate the action. Marshall's solution 8 was to hold that a "grant"
was a "contract;" the grant of land by the State of Georgia "implies a
contract" by the State "not to reassert" its right to the land in question. 9
Georgia's seizure of the lands thus violated not the just compensation
clause, but the contracts clause.
The reasoning in support of the Court's conclusion, that a "grant" is
also a "contract," is instructive for our purposes. "It would be strange,"
Marshall commented, "if a contract to convey was secured by the constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected." 20 This
merely restates the problem: Does it make sense to protect contract
rights without also protecting property rights? Marshall solved the problem in Fletcher essentially by ignoring the textual difference between the
contracts and just compensation clauses. 2 If takings are also impairments of contract, and if impairments of contract are also takings, then
the constitutional scheme seems to make little sense. But even if we overlook its textual improbability, Marshall's solution fails to eliminate the
16. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
17. Id at 135.
18. Marshall's reasoning is nearly identical to that of a legal opinion previously issued by
Alexander Hamilton. See B. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 21-22. Hamilton's argument had been
paraphrased by counsel for Peck. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 123.
19. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136-37.
20. Id at 137.
21.

See J. SHIRLEY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES 408-09 (1895); Currie, supra note 6, at 895. Currie points out that Marshall's
construction leaves some, albeit reduced, "independent field of operation" for the just compensation
clause. Id at 896. Marshall, however, made no attempt to reconcile his reading with the
constitutional text. Contrast Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 109-11 (1834), in which Justice
Story's opinion observes that no constitutional provision restrains states from taking property
without compensation.
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"strangeness" of the constitutional scheme. Under his view, a purchaser
of property is protected only where the State is the seller. Specifically,
the State of Georgia could seize the property of any citizens who were
not grantees from the State. Is this not also "strange," since it treats
differently persons whose rights as against the world, including the government, are identical?22
Bowen v. PublicAgencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment23 is
the mirror image of Fletcher v. Peck. In Bowen, the federal government
reneged on a written commitment to allow state and local governments
to withdraw from the Social Security system at any time. The commitment had been made in exchange for the voluntary participation of those
governments in the system. This would appear to be an impairment of
the obligation of contract if it is a constitutional violation at all. Because
the contracts clause does not apply to the federal government, however,
the respondent governments characterized the federal government's
action as a taking of property. Marshall's logic in Fletcher could have
been used in reverse: Would it not be "strange" that the valuable right to
withdraw from the Social Security scheme could be taken away without
compensation, after the federal government had received its
consideration?
In Bowen, however, the Court did not follow Marshall's reasoning.
The Court held that respondent's right, however valuable, bore "little, if
any, resemblance to rights held to constitute 'property' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."'2 4 The Court's reasoning is somewhat
unclear,"5 but it does not seem to be based on the contractual nature of
the right to withdraw.2 6 Apparently, the right "did not rise to the level
of 'property' "27 because it was merely executory and the United States
had given generalized notice, before the agreement was made, that it
could alter the terms of the program. 8 Thus, the Court applied contracts clause analysis of the most grudging and positivistic sort to prove
22. See Hutchinson, supranote 6, at 416; Trickett, Is a Granta Contract? 54 AM. L. REv. 718,
729 (1920).
23. 106 S. Ct. 2390 (1986).
24. Id. at 2398.
25. The Court reasoned that the right to withdraw from the Social Security system is not a
"debt" or an "obligation ... to provide benefits under a contract for which the obligee paid a
monetary premium" and therefore that precedents protecting federal debts and obligations as
"property" were inapplicable. Id. at 2398-99.
26. Indeed, the Court implied that a contractual term over which the respondents had "any
bargaining power" or for which they had provided "independent consideration" might have been
considered protected property. Id. at 2399. This may demonstrate that, in the Court's view, some
executory contracts create rights under the just compensation clause, although this language also
may be merely unconsidered dicta.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2398 n.19, 2399.
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that the public employers had been denied no property right.29 Although
the Court's result may be correct, its property analysis seems an indirect
way to reach the conclusion that the federal government is not forbidden
to impair the obligation of contracts.
Historical evidence from the founding period only complicates the
puzzle. To the extent the terms were distinguished, "contract" seems to
have been understood as a subcategory of property. Blackstone, the
Framers' leading authority on the common law, treats contract as "property in action."3 His discussion of contract law appears in the Commentaries solely as one of the various means by which title to property may
be acquired.3" Contract would seem to have no higher legal status than
title by gift, grant, marriage, or occupancy.32 Property, according to
Blackstone, is the essential concept-the "third absolute right, inherent
in every Englishman., 3 3 This is not to say, however, that contract rights
are unimportant. Rather, they are subsumed in the larger concept of
property. Blackstone's definition of property is compendious enough to
comprise contract rights as well as more tangible forms of property. The
rights of a propertyholder, he explains, "consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."3 4
The concepts of property inherited from the English common law
were echoed and even expanded by the Framers. Madison, for example,
wrote an essay on property in which he distinguished between the term
"property" in its "particular application" and in its "larger and juster
meaning."' 35 He defined the "particular application" by paraphrasing
Blackstone (without attribution): "that dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every
other individual."' 36 Madison associated this meaning with the just com29. Under the contracts clause, a state can avoid restrictions by the simple expedient of
announcing, in advance, that it does not intend to comply with its contracts. E.g., Greenwood v.
Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13, 17 (1882). But see Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 339 (1827)
(Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (contending that allowing legislatures to reserve the right to revoke

contracts renders the contracts clause meaningless). By contrast, it is unconstitutional for the
government to disturb a property interest arbitrarily, even if it announces in advance its intent to do
so. See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
30.

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *440.

31. Id. at *442-70.
32. Contrast Thomas Hobbes, who defined "Justice" as meaning that "men performe their
Covenants made." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, pt. I, ch. XV, at 71 (London 1651) (emphasis deleted).
33. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138. The first two are natural liberty and personal
security. Id. at *125, *130.
34. Id at *134.
35. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 101 (essay entitled "Property,"

which appeared in The National Gazette, Mar. 27, 1792).
36. I d; cf 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (minor textual variations).
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pensation clause.37 In its "larger and juster meaning," Madison saw
property as embracing "every thing to which a man may attach a value
and have a right," including "the free use of his faculties and [the] free
choice of the objects on which to employ them."38
Madison's essay concluded that property in both the narrower and
broader senses warrants legal protection: "Government is instituted to
protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights
of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. '39 His principal concern, it seems, was with the acquisition and transfer of property
rather than its mere possession; that is, with contract rights as well as
property rights. "That is not a just government, nor is property secure
under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny
to part of its citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of
their occupations, which ... are the means of acquiring property."'
Gouverneur Morris was in agreement. As one scholar has
commented:
[T]he rights of property Morris was so concerned with were those essential to a commercial society, the rights of property in transaction. Everyone knew that people's possessions should be secure from theft or
arbitrary confiscation; Morris' arguments urged that in a commercial
society the freedom of disposition and the security of contractual
agree41
ments were at least as important as this physical security.
The Founders' emphasis on acquisition and transfer as well as possession was consistent with the development of a commercial republic.42
An agrarian economy could be preserved on the basis of property rights
alone; commerce required exchange. The emphasis on contract was also
connected with the distrust of a landed nobility and attendant aristocratic institutions.43 The constitutional scheme tends toward a social
system of economic mobility--of static inequality but expansive opportunity-rather than one of fixed concentrations of wealth.' At the same
time, however, the need to protect rights of possession was seen to follow
from the rights of acquisition. "The personal right to acquire property,
37. 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 103.
38. Id at 101.
39. Id. at 102.

40. Id.
41. J. Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 33-34.
42. See generallyTHE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A. Hamilton) (on the importance of the Union to

the development of American commerce).
43. See, eg., Pennsylvania Packet, Mar. 11, 1780, at 2, col. 1 (G. Morris), quoted in J.
Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 30 ("Above all things government should never forget that restrictions

on the use of wealth may produce a land monopoly, which is most thoroughly pernicious.").
44. Hence the trend toward abolition of primogeniture and entail during the founding period.
See I WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 59-60 (P. Ford ed. 1892); I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON,
1751-1780, at 300-01 (1941).
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which is a natural right," Madison stated late in life, "gives to property,
when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right."4
The Founders' views, however, do not explain the differential treatment of contract and property rights in the Constitution. Although contract rights were not seen as identical to property rights, they were a type
of property right. Thus, it cannot be said that one right was more valuable than the other. It remains to be seen why each category of rights
should be protected only against different levels of government.
II
FRAMING OF THE CONTRACTS AND JUST
COMPENSATION CLAUSES

The historical record of the events and debate at the time of adoption of the Constitution and Bill of Rights casts little direct light on the
question here. Although Madison commented in a letter to Jefferson
that the contracts clause, along with two other prohibitions on state
action in article I, section 10, "created more enemies than all the errors
in the System positive and negative put together,, 46 we have little record
of this controversy. Records concerning adoption of the just compensation clause are even more sparse. Nonetheless, it is useful to canvass the
available sources, both to eliminate possible explanations that are inconsistent with the record and to discover evidence that explains why the
rights of contract and property received such disparate treatment in the
Constitution.
A.

The Northwest Ordinance and the Treaty of Paris

Both the contracts and just compensation clauses originated in article 2 of the Northwest Ordinance, which was adopted by Congress under
the Articles of Confederation on July 13, 1787, some six weeks after the
Constitutional Convention had convened. The Northwest Ordinance's
precursor to the just compensation clause provided:
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the judgment
of his peers, or the law of the land; and should the public exigencies make
it necessary for the common preservation to take any person[']s property,
or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for
the same ....
47
45. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 361 (speech at the Virginia
Constitutional Convention, Dec. 2, 1829); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 78
(protection of unequal faculties of acquiring property is "the first object of government"); see J.
Nedelsky, supra note 12, at 93-95 ("the protection of vested rights assumes supreme importance" to
Madison because they are the result of "the exercise of the faculties for acquiring property").
46. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 271 (letter of Oct. 17, 1788).
47. NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 2, cl.5,reprintedin 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS 340 (R. Hill ed. 1936). It should be noted that the first portion of this provision is a
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According to Richard Henry Lee, "It seemed necessary, for the security
of property among uninformed, and perhaps licentious people as the
greater part of those who go there are, that a strong toned government
should exist, and the rights of property be clearly defined."4 8 This suggests that the need for explicit, nationally imposed definition and protection for property rights, going beyond the common law and local
legislation, was associated with the lesser degree of sophistication of people on the frontier.
The Northwest Ordinance's precursor to the contracts clause, which
followed immediately after the provision just quoted, provided:
[A]nd in the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and
declared; that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said
territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously
formed.49
This provision had no counterpart in the state constitutions of that day,
and no explanation for its appearance has been found.
These provisions are of interest for two reasons. First, the two provisions were closely associated in the Northwest Ordinance, being successive clauses of the same article, connected by the conjunction "and."
Indeed, the contract provision was said to be intended for the "the just
preservation of rights and property," thus emphasizing the connection
between the rights protected. Second, the two provisions applied to the
same unit of government-the territory. Under what would soon
become our Constitution, the territories are subject to the constitutional
restraints applicable to the federal government; but in some ways federal
power over the territories closely resembles state governmental powers.50
The provisions 'could therefore have set a precedent for applying their
restraints to the federal government, to state governments, or to both.
These factors make it all the more striking that the Framers separated
the two concepts in the Constitution and applied each to a different level
of government.
Another potential precursor to the clauses, the treaty of peace with
Great Britain (the "Treaty of Paris"), similarly accentuates the oddity of
prototype for the due process clause, and the second for the just compensation clause. The clauses
follow in the same order in the fifth amendment.
48. 8 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 620 (E. Burnett ed. 1963).
Lee's remarks may have been addressed to other sections of the Northwest Ordinance, which set
forth the rules of intestate succession, dower rights, testamentary succession, recordation of title, and
conveyance by lease, bargain, or sale, rather than to the just compensation clause alone.
49. NoRTHwEsT ORDINANCE art. 2, cl. 7, reprinted in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, supra note 47.

50. Congress' power to make "all needful Rules and Regulations" for the governance of the
territories, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, is a source of plenary governing authority, rather than of
enumerated powers.
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the constitutional scheme. The treaty protected British subjects both
from "any lawful impediment" to the collection of bona fide debts and
from confiscation of property."' This language required the United
States to protect the contract and property rights of British subjects from
any legal impairment, an obligation logically coterminous with the protections embodied by the just compensation and contracts clauses. If the
Framers had been concerned with enforcing these treaty obligations, it
would have been logical to prohibit both levels of government from
impairments of contracts and uncompensated takings. That the two
principles were associated in treaty as well as in domestic legislation reinforces the conclusion that the Framers' failure to protect contract and
property rights against both the states and the federal government in the
Constitution cannot be explained by inadvertence. The obligations
imposed by the Treaty of Paris necessarily drew attention to the connection between these issues.
B.

The 1787 Constitution and the ContractsClause

The early drafts of the Constitution at the Convention contained no
contracts clause or equivalent provision. This may be explained by the
fact that the forces that later favored a contracts clause at first devoted
their energies to an attempt to invest Congress with the power to nullify
any state law thought to be unwise or contrary to the plan of union.
Such a power was thought by its advocates, including Madison, to be
"necessary to secure individuals against encroachments on their
rights."5 2 Madison thought specific restraints against violation of contracts "not sufficient" because legislatures could evade them at will by
using "an infinitude of legislative expedients." 53 Only when that effort
had narrowly failed did the delegates turn to more precisely tailored protections against the most common excesses of democracy in the states.
On August 28, 1787, Rufus King of Massachusetts moved to add a
constitutional prohibition, applicable to the states alone, against interference with "private contracts.",54 The wording of the provision was to be
that of the Northwest Ordinance. Gouverneur Morris spoke in opposi51. Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and his Britannic
Majesty, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, arts. IV, VI, 8 Stat. 80, 81-82, T.S. No. 104.
52. See 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 27 (letter to Jefferson, Oct. 24,
1787).
53. Id. at 27-28. Among the "expedients" available to state legislatures to defeat contracts
were statutes of limitations, evidentiary rules, moratoriums on court jurisdiction, and requirements
that creditors accept payment in something other than hard currency. A broad congressional power
to nullify such laws would more effectively bar such expedients than would a specific prohibition.
54. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 439-40. The entire debate
on this day is recorded on these pages of Farrand's Records. The quotations in the following text
will not be separately noted.
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tion, stating that "[t]his would be going too far. There are a thousand
laws relating to bringing actions-limitations of actions & which affect
contracts." He further noted that the federal judiciary would be "a protection in cases within their jurisdiction"-presumably cases involving
citizens from different states. "[W]ithin the State itself," Morris said, "a
majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among themselves." This suggests a principal concern for the impact of state legislation on interstate commerce, and relatively little concern, on Morris's
part, for preventing infringements of contractual rights within the individual states. It also suggests that Morris believed that an absolute prohibition on impairments of the obligation of contract would be
impracticable.
Madison spoke in favor of the provision, while reiterating his view
that only a general power of Congress to nullify state laws would be adequate protection. Although he acknowledged that Morris was correct
that "inconveniences might arise" from the absolute prohibition, he contended that "on the whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it."
George Mason of Virginia opposed the provision, noting, "This is
carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that can not be foreseen,
where some kind of interference will be proper, & essential." He gave as
an example a statute of limitations for collecting on bonded indebtedness.
In the Maryland House of Delegates, Luther Martin made a similar
argument that in times of "great public calamities and distress" it might
become the "duty of government" to interfere with contractual obligations.5 Martin mentioned the more pertinent examples of laws "totally
or partially stopping the courts of justice, or authorizing the debtor to
pay by instalments, or by delivering up his property to his creditors at a
reasonable and honest valuation." 6
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who previously had supported the
provision but without recorded reasons, now pointed out that the answer
to the objections raised by Mason and Morris was that "retrospective
interferences only are to be prohibited. '57 Wilson's point introduced a
note of confusion in the Convention. Madison asked whether protection
55. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 214-15 (speech delivered
Nov. 29, 1787) (emphasis deleted).
56. Id. at 215 (emphasis deleted). These sentiments were not unusual. New York's
recommended amendments to the 1787 Constitution included one which would allow the states to
pass insolvency laws for the relief of debtors other than merchants and traders. 1 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

ed. 1881) [hereinafter
57.

330 (J. Elliot

DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS].

2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11,

at 440.

This is the

interpretation ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
213, 215-17 (1827), over the only dissenting opinion ever written by Chief Justice Marshall in a
constitutional case.
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of contracts from retrospective interference was not "already done by the
prohibition of ex post facto laws." But at that stage, the Convention had
not yet adopted an ex post facto provision applicable to the states. The
ex post facto clause to which Madison presumably referred, which had
been debated six days before, was applicable only to Congress. 8 Apparently following up on this suggestion, Edward Rutledge then made a substitute motion to prohibit the states from passing bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws.5 9 This motion carried.'
The next day, John Dickinson of Delaware reported the results of
his researches in Blackstone to the effect that "the terms 'ex post facto'
related to criminal cases only; that they would not consequently restrain
the States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further
provision for this purpose would be requisite."'" Subsequently, the Committee on Style proposed the contracts clause in its present form, and on
September 14, the Convention adopted it without further recorded
debate.6 2
Immediately upon its adoption, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
moved to apply the contracts clause to the federal government as well as
to the states. His reasoning is familiar: Since the contracts clause protects against breaches of the public faith, Congress ought to be "laid
under the like prohibitions." 6 3 The motion failed for lack of a second. 4
This further demonstrates that application of the contracts clause to the
states and not the federal government was deliberate.
Both debate and historical context make clear that-whatever else it
may mean-the contracts clause was intended to prevent the states from
enacting laws retroactively relieving debtors from the payment of their
private debts.6 In the depressed economic conditions of the Confederation period, many states had passed laws to relieve private debtors
including: debt moratoriums; laws allowing debts to be paid in gradual
installments despite contrary terms of the contract; laws allowing debts
58. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
59. Madison's notes record that Rutledge used the language "retrospective laws." 2 RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 440. The printed journal recorded the motion as
using the language "ex post facto laws." Id. Marginal notes by George Washington and David
Brearly corroborate the journal rendition, as does Dickenson's subsequent comment quoted in text.
Id. at 440 n.19.
60. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 440.
61. 2 id. at 448-49. This definition of "ex post facto" was subsequently adopted by the Court
in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
62. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 619. The Committee
initially proposed that no state shall pass laws "altering or impairing the obligation of contracts."
Id. at 597. The words "altering or" were later omitted.
63. Id. at 619.
64. Id.
65. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 204-06 (1819).
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to be paid in commodities rather than hard currency; and laws requiring
creditors to accept paper money (often of little value) as legal tender for
the payment of debts. 6 These were the specific evils that inspired the
contracts clause. It is important to bear in mind that the type of contract
the Framers had most in mind was the contract of debt.6 7
C. The Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause
The origins of the just compensation clause are well known, though
there are few records bearing on the drafting and adoption of the constitutional provision itself.68 Unlike the contracts clause, the principle of
the just compensation clause was deeply embedded in both the common
law and natural law traditions. Blackstone insisted that if the legislature
required a landowner to surrender his property for the common good, it
must also give him "a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury
thereby sustained." 69 Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Van
Bynkershoek agreed with this conclusion.7 ° With some exceptions (takings of undeveloped land for roads, wartime requisitions, and seizure of
the property of Tory Loyalists), the colonies regularly paid compensation
when taking property for public use.7 1 Compensation was, however,
made pursuant to specific statutory authorization or judicial decision,
and not as a matter of constitutional right. As of 1789, only Vermont
66. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 353-55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.,
dissenting); A. NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 17751789, at 570-71 (1927); B. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 4-6, 15-16.
67. For a recent comparison of the historical background to the current interpretation of the
contracts clause, see Kmiec & McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525 (1987).
68. For further elaboration of the historical background of the just compensation clause, see F.
MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1036 (1985); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 553-88 (1972);
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985). For differing views about the present significance of the
clause, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); R. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).

69.

1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.

70.

2 J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW pt.

III, ch. 5,

§§ XXIV-XXIX (Nugent trans. 4th ed. 1792) (1747); E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 112 (J.
Chitty trans. 1870) (1758); H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 385, 807 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925) (1646); 2 S.PUFENDORF, THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 1285 (C. & W. Oldfather
trans. 1934) (1688); C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LInRI DUO 218-24 (T.
Frank trans. 1930) (1737).
71. The evidence for this conclusion is assembled in Stoebuck, supra note 68, at 579-83. A
contrary conclusion is reached in M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 17801860, at 63-64 (1977). The disagreement largely revolves around the significance to be attached to
uncompensated takings of undeveloped or unenclosed land for roadbuilding. Stoebuck argues that
compensation was not given in such instances because of a presumption that the value of the
undeveloped land taken for the road was offset by the benefit of access to the road. Stoebuck, supra
note 68, at 582-83. But see Note, supra note 68, at 695 n.6 (disputing Stoebuck's analysis).
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and Massachusetts had included just compensation requirements in their
constitutions.7 2
There is no stated explanation for the decision to apply the just compensation clause to the federal government and not to the states. At first
blush, however, this may seem less puzzling than the decision to apply
the contracts clause to the states and not the federal government. The
entire Bill of Rights, of which the just compensation clause is a part, was
a restriction on federal, not state power.73 The just compensation clause
was not unique in this regard. In part, then, the clause was not applied
to the states at this juncture simply because attention was drawn to limiting power to prevent an overpowerful central government. This cannot
be the full answer, however, because the House of Representatives
adopted three additional limitations on state power as part of the Bill of
Rights.7 4 Indeed, although the Senate rejected them,75 Madison, who
proposed these limitations, described them as "the most valuable" of his
proposed amendments to the Constitution.7 6 Conspicuously, the just
compensation clause was not among the provisions Madison and the
House would have applied to the states. This strongly suggests that the
decision not to apply the just compensation clause to the states was
deliberate.
So far as historical records show, none of the participants in the
Constitutional Convention ever proposed that the 1787 Constitution
include a just compensation clause, or any equivalent to it. Indeed, the
1787 Constitution contained no reference to the rights of "property"
whatsoever.7 7 Nor did any of the states petition Congress to include a
72. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 958 (B. Poore 2d ed.
1878) [hereinafter B. POORE]; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. I, § 2, reprinted in 2 B. POORE, supra, at
1868; see also VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § II, reprintedin 2 B. POORE, supra, at 1859.
73. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-49 (1833); see Currie,supra note 6,
at 964-68; Fairman, The Supreme Court and the ConstitutionalLimitations on State Governmental
Authority, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 40 (1953). But see 2 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 1066-76
(contending that many provisions of the Bill of Rights were originally intended to apply to state as
well as federal government). This understanding continued to be accepted until many years after
passage of the fourteenth amendment. Beginning with the just compensation clause in 1897, many
provisions of the Bill of Rights were held to be applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968)
(sixth amendment's right to jury trial); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (just
compensation clause).
74. Madison's three proposed protections against state governments were the "equal rights of
conscience," the "freedom of the press," and the right to "trial by jury in criminal cases." 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (June 8, 1789). The House adopted all three, with
minor variations, on August 17, 1789. Id. at 784.
75. Id. at 86 (Sept. 21, 1789).
76. Id. at 784 (Aug. 17, 1789).
77. The only place the term "property" appears in the 1787 Constitution is in article IV,
section 3, clause 2, where it refers to "Property belonging to the United States."
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just compensation provision in the initial amendments to the Constitution. Although the protection of property and the role of men of property in the government were major topics of discussion, the 1787
Constitution relied almost exclusively on institutional arrangements to
secure property rights.
The first recorded proposal for a just compensation provision for the
United States Constitution was made by Madison, when he presented his
draft amendments to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789.78
No letter or statement by Madison has been found to explain why he
made this proposal, or how it was drafted. Likewise, there are no
recorded discussions in the Congress or the state legislatures that cast
light on why the just compensation clause was thought to be a necessary
addition to the Constitution, or why, if necessary, it was not thought
equally applicable to the states. Indeed, the clause was one of the least
controversial provisions in the Bill of Rights, occasioning no recorded
substantive comment at all.
III
POssIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT
TREATMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS AND
PROPERTY RIGHTS

Although the Framers provided no explicit explanation of the different protections afforded contractual and property rights, this treatment is
broadly consistent with two different but complementary understandings
of the rights involved and their relation to the constitutional system. The
first relies on a conventional understanding of the difference between
property and contract, and finds the latter of greater importance to the
commercial life of the nation. The second relies on a more abstract
understanding of the distinction between property and contract; it finds
contractual rights relatively more secure in the hands of the federal government and property rights relatively more secure in the hands of the
states. I find a suggestion of these explanations in the interestingly divergent accounts of the contracts clause offered by Hamilton and Madison
in the FederalistPapers. I will therefore call them the "Hamiltonian"
and the "Madisonian" explanations.7 9
A.

The "Hamiltonian"Explanation

In FederalistNo. 7, Hamilton sets forth the various tendencies that
78. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 74, at 452.
79. These "Hamiltonian" and "Madisonian" explanations must be understood as analytical
constructs based on the thought of these Founders, and not as historical reconstructions of their
actual views. As a historical matter, these constructs may exaggerate the degree to which
Hamilton's and Madison's political theories differed at this period. See, eg., fnfra note 80.
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might cause the states, in the absence of a more effectual union, to go to
war against one another. One of these is interference by one state with
contractual obligations owed to citizens of other states. "Laws in violation of private contracts," he says, "amount to aggressions on the rights
of those States whose citizens are injured by them." 0 Indeed, he points
out that the "enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode Island"
had excited a "disposition to retaliation" in neighboring Connecticut.
Hamilton argued, moreover, that "if unrestrained by any additional
checks," there was no reason to expect any improvement in the individual state legislatures in the future."1 In FederalistNo. 22, he elaborated
that the "interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States," if not
"restrained by a national control," would become both "serious sources
of animosity and discord" and "injurious impediments to the intercoursT
between the different parts of the Confederacy. 82
The reason for the contracts clause, then, was not merely that laws
impairing the obligation of contract are "atrocious breaches of moral
obligation and social justice"-though Hamilton also believed this to be
true. 3 The principal motivating factor was the effect of such laws on
citizens of other states, on commerce throughout the country, and even
on peaceful relations among the states. Charles Pinckney shared this
understanding. In the debate before the South Carolina ratifying convention, he described the limitations on the powers of the states, including
the contracts clause, as "the soul of the Constitution."8 4
Henceforth, the citizens of the states may trade with each other without
fear of tender-laws or laws impairing the nature of contracts. The citizen
of South Carolina will then be able to trade with those of Rhode Island,
North Carolina, and Georgia, and be sure of receiving the value of his
commodities.8 5
This statement echoes Gouverneur Morris' reaction to Rufus King's
proposal of a contracts clause, and parallels the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the commerce clause. When the baneful effects of
state legislation are visited upon the citizens of the state itself, it is reasonable to rely upon the political processes to correct it. And if they do
not, as Morris pointed out, "within the State itself a majority must rule,
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 9, at 65. Madison made a similar observation in his
Notes on the Confederacy, supra note 15, at 321, but did not develop the theme in his Federalist
essays.
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 9, at 65. Rhode Island was notorious at that time for
its debtor relief legislation. See A. NEVINS, supra note 66, at 570-71.
82.
83.

THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 9, at 144-45.
Id. No. 7, at 65.

84.

4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 56, at 333.

85.

Id. at 335.
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whatever may be the mischief done among themselves."8' 6 Constitutional
prohibitions are needed principally to protect against parochial legislation with effects on out-of-state business that disrupt the flow of national
commerce.
This approach is similar to the so-called "negative" commerce
clause doctrine, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce.8 7 Justice Jackson made the classic statement of this
doctrine in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond:
[The] principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the
gamut of powers necessary to control the economy, . . . has as its corol-

lary that the states are not separable economic units.
Our system, fostered by the Commerce clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that
he will have free access to every market in the Nation .... 8
Parallels might also be drawn to the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV and to some applications of the equal protection
clause, which also prevent state discriminatory treatment of nonresidents. Together with the contracts clause and the prohibition on state
issuance of paper money, these constitutional provisions prevent the
states from obstructing interstate commerce, and thus foster the development of the United States into an integrated commercial republic.
Indeed, in FederalistNo. 7, Hamilton treated discriminatory state trade
regulations and laws violating private contracts as aspects of the same
problem.
Under the "Hamiltonian" view, the contracts clause serves the same
ends as the Constitution's other economic provisions; however, it operates in a quite different way. The Commerce clause applies by its terms
only to interstate commerce. s9 15y contrast, the contracts clause applies
to all contracts, not just to those with parties in different states. Accord86. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 439 (Aug. 28, 1787); see
supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
87. The commerce clause itself, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is no more than a grant of power
to Congress to regulate commerce among the states. The "negative" (also called the "silent" or
"dormant") commerce clause is the judicial doctrine that the clause impliedly displaces some aspects
of state regulatory power over interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional action. See,
e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Mgrs., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
88. 336 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1949). This "free trade" understanding of the commerce clause is
challenged by Professor Kitch in Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 9-55 (A.D. Tarlock, ed. 1981).
89. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This is the traditional understanding of the reach of the
commerce clause. This understanding has been disputed, see 1 W. CROSSKEY, supranote 7, at 50-83,
but I will assume its validity for purposes of this discussion. While Congress' power to regulate
commerce under the commerce clause now effectively extends to purely intrastate transactions, see,
e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), the "negative" commerce clause retains the original
emphasis on interstate movements. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.
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ingly, the "Hamiltonian" explanation might be called into doubt. If the
protection of out-of-state obligees is the purpose, why not confine the
clause to interstate contracts, as Morris obliquely suggested?9"
The explanation, I think, is that it is important to national commerce that contractual rights-especially those derived from the quintessential contract of debt-be transferrable in the national market. IfA
borrows money from B in Philadelphia, B should be able to resell the
debt instrument to C in Baltimore without legal hindrance. If states were
permitted to impair the obligation of intrastate contracts, then a single
contract could have one meaning if held by B and a different meaning if
held by C. To confine the contracts clause to interstate contracts would
introduce a serious element of uncertainty and confusion into commercial affairs. If debt instruments are expected to enter the national market, it must be clear at the outset that they cannot be nullified by state
laws.
The reason for not applying the contracts clause to the federal government now becomes evident. Some impairments of the obligation of
contract, it was generally agreed, would be necessary. Even supporters
of the clause, like Madison, agreed that it would produce "inconveniences."9 1 In particular, the Framers anticipated some form of insolvency legislation, which would inevitably impair the obligation of
contract. It was only natural to vest in Congress the authority to adopt
such dangerous but potentially "proper, & essential" measures, insofar as
they affected interstate commerce. The exercise of congressional authority would not likely disrupt national commerce or lead to interstate hostilities. Thus, Congress was given the express authority to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."9 2 The constitutional provisions that forbid states to impair the
obligation of contracts and grant Congress the power to pass bankruptcy
laws are two sides of the same coin.
Under this analysis, the Framers failed to apply the just compensation clause to the states because they believed that takings of property
were less likely than impairments of contract to have interstate consequences. This would explain why contracts received greater protection
from state interference than property. 93 This conclusion rests, however,
on an important-and questionable-presupposition about the nature of
1637, 1648-52 (1987) (commerce clause does not prohibit state regulation of corporate shareholder
voting rights).
90. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 11, at 439 (Aug. 28, 1787).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
93. Professor Crosskey concludes that the application of the contracts clause solely to the
states demonstrates that Congress was intended to exercise plenary authority over commercial law. I
W. CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 355. He argues that the Framers intended the contracts clause to end
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"property." Property, under this view, must be conceptualized as tangible property, located in one place. This is a conventional understanding
of property: property as "thing ownership." 94 If property is viewed in
the sense of modem financial property-corporate shares, electronic
transfers, bank deposits, and so forth-then property is no less interstate
in nature than are contracts. Indeed, in this sense, property is little more
than a web of contractual commitments. When, however, the dominant
concept of property is land and comparable fixed, tangible "things," it is
plausible to believe that state action affecting property rights will have
consequences principally within the state. The provision of federal diversity jurisdiction might then be sufficient protection for the out-of-state
claimant.
It also seems plausible that contract, and not property in this conventional sense, is the principal object of commerce across state lines. If,

as Blackstone says, a contract is "property in action," then commerce,
too, is property in action. Restrictions on the transfer of goods in the

national market are more likely to take the form of interference with
contracts than the seizure of tangible property. Although title to property-like contractual rights-can be transferred to another state, the

Framers may well have made a rough empirical judgment that contractual rights, especially debts, were much more likely to travel across state
lines. 95 It therefore seems reasonable-if the purpose of the contracts
clause is to protect against interstate hostility and the disruption of interstate commerce-that the Framers would prohibit the states from passstate power over the law of contracts, but did not likely intend to end all governmental power over
contracts.
The Contracts Clause ... could not, therefore, have been intended as an interdiction of
something the Federal Convention regarded as inherently evil; it was a provision, instead,
for making some power, or powers, of Congress, in so farforth, exclusive.
Id. (emphasis in original). The contracts clause thus becomes an argument in favor of Crosskey's
central thesis: that the commerce power of Congress is not limited to interstate commerce. The
alternative reading of the contracts clause, presented in the text, is fully consistent with the conventional view of the commerce power. Indeed, it is based on the assumption that the principal concern
of the Framers in this area was to provide federal authority over commercial matters with interstate
effects.
94. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (discussing
whether "property" in the just compensation clause means a "physical thing"); B. ACKERMAN,
supra note 68, at 97-100, 116-67 (contrasting lay and legal understandings of property); Grey, The
Disintegration of Property, 22 NoMos: PROPERTY 69, 71-73 (1980) (listing six current uses of the
term "property").
95. The interstate nature of debt was the subject of contemporary comment. See, eg.,
Madison, supra note 15, at 321; see A. NEVINS, supra note 66, at 570-72. I have encountered no
significant discussion of problems arising from interstate ownership of property. Interestingly, New
York's ratifying convention proposed confining federal bankruptcy power to the debts of merchants
and traders, leaving the states free to enact insolvency legislation on behalf of others. IDEBATES IN
THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 56, at 330. This suggests that some debts were thought to
have more of an interstate character than others.
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ing laws impairing the obligation of contract, while leaving property
rights to the protection of state law.
B.

The "'Madisonian"Explanation

Madison's explanation of the purpose of the contracts clause in Federalist No. 44 differs markedly from Hamilton's in No. 7. Madison
explains that "[b]ills of attainder, ex postfacto laws, and laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the
social compact and to every principle of sound legislation. ' 96 The reason
for the clause, then, is perhaps not its impact on interstate commerce, but
the prevention of injustice. If so, it is difficult to see why laws impairing
the obligation of contracts should not be forbidden at the federal as well
as the state level, as are bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
Madison himself posed, and answered, this very question. In a letter
to Jefferson explaining why Congress should be given the authority to
nullify state laws-a power explicitly aimed at such injustices as the "violations of contracts"-he noted: "It may be asked how private rights will
be more secure under the Guardianship of the General Government than
under the State Governments, since they are both founded on the republican principle which refers the ultimate decision to the will of the majority . . . ."' The full answer to this question would, he said, "unfold the
true Principles of Republican Government;" 98 the nub of the answer is
that a larger, more extended republic would be less vulnerable to control
by particular interest groups or coalitions.9 9 Madison's discussion of the
contracts clause in Federalist No. 44, after the portion quoted above,
proceeds:
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which
has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting
personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential
speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of
the community .... They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will... give a regular course to the business of society.X°°
The source of the problem, therefore, is "fluctuating policy" and "sudden
changes"-the instability of government that is to be found in small,
unchecked popular assemblies like state legislatures. The very design of
the federal government was intended to bring stability-to "give a regu96.
97.

98.
99.
100.

THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 9, at 282.
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 28.

Id.
See id. at 31.
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 9, at 282-83.
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lar course to the business of society." It was the state governments, not
the new federal government, which Madison believed most likely to
endanger "personal rights. 10 1
The "Madisonian" explanation for applying the contracts clause
solely to the states, then, is that an extended republic, deliberative representation, and the network of checks and balances that characterize the
federal scheme make further provision against interference with contracts unnecessary. Moreover, since an absolute ban on laws impairing
the obligation of contracts would produce "inconveniences," 10 2 it made
sense to preserve flexibility by rejecting the application of the contracts
clause to the federal government. Bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws (assuming the latter are confined to criminal statutes) are unnecessary to good government, and thus could be banned at both levels.
The Madisonian explanation gains force when contract and property rights are distinguished not on the conventional ground but on a
more sophisticated legal basis, expounded by Professor Wesley
Hohfeld. 1°3 Under his analysis, the distinctive feature of property is that
it is a right "good against the world," while contract is a right good only
as against determinate persons-those with whom one has made the contract."° A particular object may give rise to both contractual rights and
property rights. X may contract with Y for exclusive use and enjoyment
of real property owed by Y. X has a contractual right as against Y; if Y
enters the property he is in breach of contract. However, X also has
obtained, by virtue of the contract, rights against the world, in the nature
of property rights.
The principal danger addressed by the contracts clause is that the
government will favor one determinate set of persons over anotherdebtors over creditors. The relationship in question is person to person.
The principal danger addressed by the just compensation clause, on the
other hand, is that the government itself will appropriate the property
right. The relationship is government to individual. The distinction
between the two constitutional provisions, under this view, is not
101. See also I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 74, at 458. Madison stated that the
restrictions on state power in article I, section 10, were "wise and proper restrictions in the
Constitution. I think there is more danger of those powers being abused by the State Governments
than by the Government of the United States." IL
102. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
103. Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in JudicialReasoning, 26 YALE L.J.
710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld 11]; Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions As Applied in
JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). For a related explanation of the distinction between
property and tort, see Calabresi & Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, andInalienability:One

View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
104. Hohfeld's analysis is based on the classic distinction between rights in personam and in
rem. Hohfeld II, supra note 103, at 718-21.
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between tangible and intangible rights, but between forced transfers to
other individuals and forced transfers to the government.
I have spoken thus far of the principal dangers addressed by the
contracts and just compensation clauses. Each has a secondary significance, of lesser legal weight, that cuts the other way. Ever since Fletcher

v. Peck, 10 5 and contrary to strong indications in the legislative history,

the contracts clause has been held to apply to contracts entered into by
the government itself, as well as to private contracts. 106 When the relationship in question is that between government and individual, the case
is conceptually more like a takings case than the prototypical impairment
of obligation of contract. The just compensation clause also has a second

element-the "public use" requirement-that prohibits the taking of
property, even with compensation, for other than a public use. The dan-

ger here is that one person's property will be taken for the private benefit
of another. The relationship in question is person to person. Conceptually, cases arising under the "public use" limitation are more like con07
tracts clause cases than prototypical takings.1
There is a close connection between the principal problems
addressed by the contracts and just compensation clauses and the political evils Madison viewed as characteristic of the states and the federal
government, respectively. As explained by Madison, there are two inherent weaknesses in republican government that give rise to two necessities
of constitutional design: "to guard the society against the oppression of

its rulers," and "to guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part.'

0 8

The first concern is that government officials will rule

105. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
106. The Northwest Ordinance provision and Rufus King's initial proposal were expressly
limited to "private" contracts. See supra text accompanying notes 47-66. Debate in the Convention
centered entirely on whether this proposal "would be going too far"-no one criticized it for failing
to go far enough. The subsequent deletion of the reference to "private contracts" was not explained.
The discussion and historical background provide no reason to infer that this change was intended to
broaden coverage. Even after the word "private" was deleted, Charles Pinckney interpreted the
clause as preventing states from "interfering in private contracts." 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE
CONVENTIONS, supra note 56, at 334. The only unequivocal statements that the clause applied to
public contracts were made by opponents of the Constitution and of the clause. 4 id. at 190
(statement of James Galloway); 3 id. at 474 (statement of Patrick Henry). Patrick Henry appeared
to be answering an unrecorded assertion to the contrary by Madison, and both Henry and Galloway
were immediately contradicted by participants in the Convention. See 4 id. at 191 (staiament of W.
R. Davie); 3 id. at 478 (statement by Edmund Randolph). Professors Wright and Corwin have
concluded that the clause was not intended to apply to public contracts. E. CORWIN, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 167-68 (1977); B. WRItrr, supra note 6, at 3-16.
107. The "public use" aspect of the fifth amendment is of little present-day significance. R.
EPSTEIN, supra note 68, at 161-62; Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An
Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949); see, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984) (upholding state statute condemning land for sale to the tenants).
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 9, at 323; see also Madison, supranote 15, at 325-28
(ascribing unjust laws to self-interested legislators and to the influence of "factions").
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in their own interest instead of the interest of the people. The second
concern is that some persons will use the machinery of government to
exploit others; the dominant faction, presumably the majority, will
oppress minority interests.
Madison's celebrated argument in FederalistNo. 10 is that the second concern is best met at the federal level, where the multiplicity of
factions will make it unlikely that any one group could summon the
strength to exploit the others. His argument is familiar; I will not detail
it here." Madison concludes optimistically that the "rage for paper
money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for
any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the
whole body of the Union than a particular member of it."110
It follows, however, that the first of these concerns-the fear of selfinterested government-is best met at the state level. There, the officers
of government will live among the people, be more numerous in relation
to the population, and be more susceptible to popular control. The representatives at the federal level, by contrast, will live at a remote distance
from their constituents; offices will tend to be held by the well-known but
unrepresentative few; communication will be slow and difficult; and the
intended ethos will be one of deliberation rather than mere representation of the interests and opinions of the constituents. These arguments
were the stock in trade of the Antifederalists, I" and they had persuasive
force. Even Madison had to acknowledge (in a private letter) that "[a]s
in too small a sphere oppressive combinations may be too easily formed
against the weaker party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert
may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted
with the administration."1" 2 The faults Madison identified in the state
governments arise from an excess of popular control rather than a lack of
it. Thus Madison wrote to Jefferson that were it not for the problem of
faction, the "voice" of the majority "would be the safest criterion" of the
public good, and that "within a small sphere, this voice could be most
13
easily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed."'
Under Madison's view, it is understandable why the contracts clause
109. Probably the best summary and analysis is found in Diamond, The Federalist in HISTORY
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 659 (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey 3d ed. 1987). For an application of
modem public choice theory to Madison's argument, see V. OsTRoM, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF A
COMPOUND REPUBLIC (2d ed. 1987).

110.
111.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 9, at 84.
See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 17-19, 48-52 (1981).
112. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 31. For a modem statement of
this view, see Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process The Jurisprudenceof Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 341, 380-91; see also McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1500-07 (1987).
113. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 29.
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should apply only to the states. Laws impairing the obligation of private
contracts are an instance of injustice by "one part of the society against
..the other part." Such laws are particularly likely to be adopted-and
likely to be particularly egregious-at the state level, where factions
(such as the debtor class) might well seize the machinery of government
for their own advantage. At the federal level, however, such laws are not
likely to pass unless they would further the public good. Indeed, the
bankruptcy clause is evidence that the Framers believed national action
impairing contractual rights might be necessary.
It is also understandable, under this view, why the just compensation clause was applied to the federal government. Since the federal government is more remote, and more likely to develop interests separate
from and in tension with the people, it is important that private property
not be exposed to confiscation for the benefit of the government. Such
confiscation had been practiced by military authorities during the revolution. Indeed, St. George Tucker, writing in 1803, stated that the main
purpose of the just compensation clause was "to restrain the arbitrary
and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public
uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practiced during the revolu11 4
tionary war, without any compensation whatever."
It is less apparent why the just compensation clause should not also
apply to the states. The "Madisonian" explanation shows why such a
provision might have been considered more vital at the federal than the
state level, but it does not explain why the clause could not have been
applied at both levels. It is possible that the clause was not applied to the
states out of simple inadvertence: No one suggested that it should be,
perhaps because the common law was thought clear enough. The "inadvertence" explanation, though, must confront the fact that Rufus King,
proponent of the contracts clause, explicitly lifted his proposal from a
provision in the Northwest Ordinance. Since the first clause of that provision is a just compensation requirement, King's proposal must have
directed the attentions of at least some of the delegates to the just compensation concept. And although the common law, as seen through
Blackstone, was tolerably clear, in practice the courts had not always
recognized just compensation as a judicially enforceable principle in the
absence of specific legislation.' 15
114. 1 ST. G. TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 305-06 (Philadelphia 1803); cf.John
Jay's essay, A Freeholder, reprinted in 5 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, supra note 10, at 312-13
(objecting to impressment of horses and other property by military officials without proper
authority).
115. See, eg., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788) (denying compensation for
wartime taking); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 56-62 (S.C. 1796) (2-2 decision)
(denying compensation for taking of unimproved land).
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Perhaps the better explanation, along "Hamiltonian" lines, is that
takings of property were viewed as an internal affair of the various states,
unlike violations of contract, which were more likely to have effects in
other states. However, no affirmative reason for restricting application of
the clause to the federal level was recorded. Unlike the impairment of
the obligation of contracts, which Madison believed necessary in some
extreme circumstances, there is no evidence that the Framers believed
property should ever be taken without compensation. The Framers
apparently saw no need to retain the power at the level of government
least likely to abuse it. The most that can be said is that the just compensation clause applies to the level of government most needful of restraint.
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAUSES

It would be rash to propose radical revisions in our understandings
of the contracts and just compensation clauses on the basis of these conclusions. The proposed explanations are, indeed, more in the nature of
speculations than of hard historical or legal conclusions. Nonetheless,
they suggest certain directions for thinking about the constitutional
issues raised by the clauses.
First, they suggest that efforts to give the contracts clause a broad
application at the state level, so as to protect what might more conventionally be viewed as property rights, are less objectionable than efforts to
give the just compensation clause a broad application at the federal level,
so as to protect contract rights. Thus, to take the illustrative cases with
which we began, both the expansive approach of Fletcher v. Peck 116 and
the restrictive approach of Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment117 seem appropriate, whatever the merits of their
specific holdings. This is because there was an affirmative reason to
refuse to apply the contracts clause to the federal government, but no
comparable affirmative reason to refuse to apply the just compensation
clause to the states. By the same token, the Court's decision to incorporate the just compensation clause as an aspect of the fourteenth amendment due process clause' 18 does little apparent violence to the
constitutional scheme. This decision made broad interpretations of the
contracts clause, as in -Fletcherv. Peck, less significant.
Second, these conclusions suggest that the modern thrust of contracts clause jurisprudence is precisely backwards. The Court has stated
that "impairments of a State's own contracts would face more stringent
116.
117.
118.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
106 S. Ct. 2390 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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examination under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating contractual relationships between private parties."11' 9 However, it is interference with private contracts that lies at the heart of the clause. The
reason the states, rather than the federal government, were thought in
need of this form of restraint is that state governments are especially
susceptible to control by self-aggrandizing political factions. This perspective suggests particular vigilance against laws altering private contractual arrangements. Even assuming that public contracts are properly
subsumed under the clause, 120 this should be viewed as a more marginal
application. Violation of public contracts might be better viewed, in
most instances, as a takings problem, with compensation rather than an
12 1
outright prohibition as the remedy.
Third, the analysis casts doubt on the Court's willingness to allow
states to impair the obligation of contracts merely on the showing that it
is plausibly "necessary for the general good of the public."' 2 2 The Framers well understood that there would be times when laws violating contractual rights would seem "proper, & essential" and that the restraint
imposed by the Constitution would cause "inconveniences."' 123 Their
solution was to allow such laws to be enacted only at the federal level.
Only if the public need were pressing enough to procure congressional
action, despite the safeguards of the federal system, did they think laws
impairing *privatecontracts should be enforced. The Framers relied, not
on ad hoe judgments of courts to determine when laws violative of contracts are desirable, but on procedural mechanisms of representative government and checks and balances.
Finally, and most generally, this analysis suggests that we should
not base constitutional interpretation solely upon broad principles of substantive political theory-such as the sanctity of private property. In the
minds of the Framers, these issues were complicated by the overriding
need to establish just and stable institutions of republican government.
The Framers were too practical to think they could bind the nation to
wise policy through constitutional language alone. The Framers pro119. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 n.15 (1978); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977). For a critical appraisal of these cases, see Merrill,
Public Contracts,Private Contracts and the Transformationof the ConstitutionalOrder, 37 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 597 (1987).
120. See supra note 106.
121. See McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from
PoliticalChange, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 308-11 (1987) (discussing constitutional remedies for
violations of government procurement contracts, nonprosecution agreements, and consent decrees).
122. Allied Structural Steel Corp. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978) (quoting Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438
(1934) ("The question... is whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.").
123. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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vided specific judicially enforceable protections against some of the more
pernicious evils of government. More often, however, they relied on
structural features of the federal system to prevent oppression. The
Founding generation held property and contractual rights dear, and for
good reasons. But they did not simply invest future judges with sweeping
power to protect these rights. This, no doubt, was also for good reasons.
Aggressive judicial review, when predicated on loose and discretionary
standards of judgment, is (at best) in tension with republicanism. In
'seeking to understand the design of the Constitution, therefore, we cannot automatically proceed from a principle of political right-such as
property-to an assumption that the mechanism for protecting it is judicial review. No less important is the way in which the Framers
contemplated that these principles of right would emerge through the
structure of government.

